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Abstract:  
 
Purpose: The main aim of this article is to conduct an econometric analysis and to examine 
relations between institutional factors pertaining to the quality of governance and the level of 
GDP per capita in 28 member states of the European Union. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The analysis of public governance and good governance 
concepts is based on critical analysis of the recent literature. Institutional quality of the public 
sector is analyzed as a part of New Institutional Economics theory. This allows to indicate the 
institutional dimensions of the quality of public sector. In the empirical part, focus was given 
to measuring governance and examining relations between institutional factors pertaining to 
the quality of public governance and the level of GDP per capita in 28 member states of the 
European Union. To this end, World Bank data were used, and six indicators proposed by this 
institution were assumed as synthetic measures of governance quality (The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators – WGI). 
Findings: The conducted analyses resulted in positively verifying the model of relations 
between dimensions of governance quality and the pace of economic growth in the EU-28.  
Based on correlation studies, out of the six analyzed dimensions of governance quality i.e. 
voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule 
of law and control of corruption, only political stability transpired not to be correlated to the 
level of GDP per capita in the studied economies.  
Practical Implications: The results are especially important for policy makers to understand 
the importance and the role of good governance. As for society, research results can increase 
awareness in assessing the quality of governance in each country. 
Originality/Value: The scientific results fill the gap in the research area of institutional quality 
of the public sector, and also show the significant relationship between the quality of 
governance and the economic outcomes (economic growth). 
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1. Introduction 
 
The growing importance of the public sector of the economy is nowadays a 
characteristic trend. Emerging new conditions and challenges such as rapid 
technological progress, dynamic demographic changes, migrations, deepening 
economic diversification, dynamic growth of public debt, fiscal crises and 
complicated fiscal relations between different levels of public authority, growing 
expectations of citizens for new public services, put pressure on public authorities to 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector in the economic 
dimension (Dickinsen, 2016; Barczewska-Dziobek, 2018).    
 
The authors of this study, looking for an answer to the question how to shape the 
system of effective and efficient public sector management, refer to the postulates of 
economic doctrine by the achievements of New Public Management (NPM), New 
Public Governance (NPG), as well as selected theoretical concepts of the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE).  
 
The literature often emphasizes that the concept of NPG was created as a result of 
criticism of selected assumptions of the MPM model. With an improved and more 
mature version of it, the paper puts a special emphasis on the model of public 
governance, referred to as Good Public Governance (GPG), treating it as a specific 
standard and model for good functioning of public authority.  
 
The study has several tasks: 1) to explain the relationship between governance and 
government according to public sector and public administration; 2) to outline the 
different approaches to public governance; 3) to clarify some core concepts in public 
governance theory and the different models of governance; 4) to present the 
institutional aspect of quality of public sector in the context of the idea of good public 
governance.  
 
In the empirical part of this article, focus was given to measuring governance. The 
empirical purpose of the work was to examine relations between institutional factors 
pertaining to the quality of public governance and the level of GDP per capita in 28 
member states of the European Union. It was assumed that good governance has a 
positive effect on the level of GDP of the studied countries.  
 
The primary source of knowledge used by the authors were the World Bank data. Six 
indicators proposed by this institution were assumed as synthetic measures of (good) 
public governance (The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI) i.e., Voice and 
Accountability (VA), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), Government 
Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL), Control of 
Corruption (CC). 
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2. From Traditional to Modern Models of Public Administration 
 
The observation of the evolution of the public management concept allows for 
distinguishing three basic models of public administration management (Osborne, 
2006): 
i. Old Public Administration (OPA) – a model covering the period from the late 
nineteenth century to the late seventies/early eighties of the 20th century; 
ii. New Public Management (NPM) – a model covering the period from the late 
1980s to the early 21st century; 
iii. The public governance (PG), then evolving towards New Public Governance 
(NPG) – nowadays.  
 
The theoretical foundations of the OPA are related to the traditional administration 
model and the concept of ideal bureaucracy proposed by Weber (Max Weber's Ideal 
Bureaucracy Model). Hierarchy and bureaucracy are crucial in this model, and the 
principle of its operation comes down to a precise and bureaucratic definition of the 
relations between the subordinate unit (citizen) and the superior unit (government, 
state). Weber points to the following features of ideal bureaucracy in public 
administration (Sager and Rosser, 2009; Katsamunska, 2012): 
  
i. The organisational structure of administration based on centralisation, 
hierarchical subordination, formalisation, control and discipline; 
ii. The professionalism of officials appointed on the basis of their professional 
qualifications rather than their choice (Weber believed that the choice of 
officials unnecessarily modifies and distorts the severity of hierarchical 
subordination); 
iii. A political-administrative dichotomy consisting in a strict separation of 
administration from politics (according to Weber, such separation is a 
necessary condition for eliminating corruption in public administration). 
  
Thus, while the traditional bureaucratic model favoured the process of administration 
above all, contemporary models (NPM and NPG) put the art of management before 
the art of administration. This approach is aptly characterized by Huges: 
“administration means filling in instructions, while management means achieving 
results” (Huges, 1994).  
 
In this context, it is essential to distinguish two concepts of government and 
governance. The first refers to the situation when a public authority, having formal 
legal powers, performs and implements certain actions. Governance refers to the 
execution and implementation of activities supported by the common goals of citizens 
and organisations (Rosenau, 1992). According to Wojciechowski, public governance 
is “the process of influencing public entities (institutions), including the authorities 
and public administration, on the course of public affairs, the settlement of which is 
in the interest of the general public” (Wojciechowski, 2010).  
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In turn, the term governance as a specific concept first appeared in the private sector 
(corporate governance) in the sense of organizational power and the related strategic 
level of corporate governance, as opposed to the current/operational level 
(Raczkowski and Mikułowski, 2013; Thalassinos et al., 2014; 2015). It was only later 
that the term was transferred to the public sector, interpreting it as a process of sharing 
power in the process of public decision-making, supporting the autonomy and 
independence of citizens and ensuring the process of development of the common 
good through civic involvement (Jedrzejowska-Schiffauer et al., 2019). Pereira treats 
public governance above all as a manifestation of the domination of public policy over 
public administration. According to the opinion of this author, it allows to strengthen 
the potential and powers of many stakeholders and thus a specific administrative and 
regulatory order is achieved (Pereira et al., 2017).  
 
The concept of NPM, based on the idea of managerialism in the public sector, 
emphasizes certain similarities in the functioning of public administration to the 
private sector. Hood is often considered to be the precursor of this idea (Hood, 1991). 
The idea was popularised in the 1980s and 1990s, initially in countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand and the USA, and later also in European countries. There is 
also a proof of its growing popularity in the country of the authors of this paper, i.e., 
in Poland, where research articles related to the issue in question, referring both to the 
government and local government sector are more and more frequently published 
(Zalewski, 2007; Lubińska, 2009; Krynicka, 2006; Supernat, 2003; Zawicki, 2011; 
Pająk, 2018).  
 
The key postulates of the NMP may also serve as recommendations for necessary 
changes in the context of increasing the effectiveness of the management system of 
public sector entities. They are as follows (Poniatowicz and Dziemianowicz, 2017): 
 
i. The adaptation of management methods and techniques used in the private 
sector (business-like management); 
ii. Public managerialism and liberation management – responsibility for the 
public economy should rest with highly qualified public managers, to whom 
it is much easier to assign responsibility for financial decisions than to 
passive, not always competent officials; 
iii. Result-oriented public administration and public sector; 
iv. Focus on the consumer of goods and public service – while traditional public 
management has treated members of the public as impersonal petitioners, 
NPMs treat them as individual consumers/customers who should be able to 
influence the decisions made by public policy makers; 
v. Using competitive governance – freeing up competition and market 
mechanisms in management processes, i.e. the so-called marketisation of the 
public sector; public decision-makers always face the dilemma of make or 
buy when making decisions concerning the process of production and delivery 
of public goods and services; when choosing the latter option, they cooperate 
with the private sector; 
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vi. The public sector should carry out some of its functions with the help of 
private entities, e.g. in the formula of public-private partnership or 
privatization; this is aptly illustrated by the acronym used by Osborne and 
Gaebler in the public sector context: "steer, not row" (Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992); 
vii. The “3E rule” in the evaluation of public projects (economy, effectiveness and 
efficiency); 
viii. The need for public sector risk management – it is assumed that public sector 
bodies, just like private entities, must look ahead, react dynamically to 
changes and make optimal use of available opportunities; risk management is 
the basis for such action and is an essential condition for optimising the 
delivery of public goods and services; 
ix. Moving away from the traditional understanding of the public budget toward 
performance budgeting, which allows for the identification of tasks that are 
the most important for the achievement of public objectives and the 
determination, by means of appropriate measures, the degree of completion 
of public tasks; 
x. Long-term financial planning (multi-annual public finance) – it is assumed 
that public finance management requires a long-term/perspective approach 
(long-term financial planning; multi-annual public finance); it is no longer 
sufficient to look at these issues from the perspective of the financial year 
alone; 
xi. Democratization and citizen participation – democratization of the processes 
of managing public affairs, among other things, in the formula of involving 
citizens in decision-making processes undertaken in the public sector (e.g. 
public consultations, public referendums, participatory budgeting, etc.); 
xii. Transparent public administration – special emphasis is placed on the 
transparency of public administration and, consequently, on the 
dissemination of good practices in the field of openness and transparency of 
the public sector and the related system of public finances. 
 
In the last decade, the NPM model has been criticised,  among other things, for too 
uncritical use of private sector experience and inadequacy for the specifics of public 
sector decision-making (Monteduro, 2005). As a result, a new concept of public 
governance has emerged, i.e., Public Governance (PG). It is assumed that just as in 
the past NPM replaced the traditional concept of public administration, nowadays PG 
will replace NPM (Bryson, Crosby, Bloomberg, 2014). Rhodes, based on the analogy 
to NPM, proposes the term New Public Governance (NPG), defining the process of 
public co-decision, with a significantly reduced role of government (governing 
without government) (Rhodes, 1996). While the NPM concept focuses on the 
professionalisation of management, standards and measures of success, results and 
economic effects, the NPG concept focuses on processes involving public and private 
sector actors in the form of governance as self-organizing networks, the relationship 
between public authority and society (partnership, civic participation) and the 
principles of liberal democracy (Rhodes, 1996).  
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In order to systematise and compare key management aspects in each of the described 
models of public administration (OPA, NPM and NPG), Iacovino, Barsanti and 
Cinquini (2017) propose the use of this illustrative matrix in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Public management models reference matrix  
 OPA NPM NPG 
Leading logic/ 
Subject 
Bureaucratic.  
Focus on Legitimacy, 
compliance with strict 
predetermined rules and 
procedures. 
Internal efficiency. 
Focus on Management 
and the working logic 
of each single PA. 
System efficiency, 
effectiveness. 
Focus on policy-making, 
public services, management 
and democracy. 
Systemic 
approach 
Closed system. 
The organization is 
centered on its internal 
bureaucratic and 
administrative dynamics 
with inadequate concern 
for the external 
environment. 
Partially closed 
system. 
The organization is 
oriented towards 
results. 
Partially open system. 
The organization is more 
oriented towards 
relationships and its strategic 
external environment, by 
stimulating process of 
integration and coordination. 
Perspective Micro / Self-referential. 
Procedures and rules-
oriented. 
Micro.  
Emphasis on PA 
management features. 
Involves all three levels: 
- micro (each single PA); 
- meso (PAs and company 
systems); 
- macro (socio-economic 
systems). 
Relevant 
dimensions 
Legitimacy and 
administrative, 
conformity with rules and 
regulations. 
Effectiveness, 
efficiency, economy. 
The focus is on 
ultimate performance 
results in an 
economical and 
managerial 
perspective - “The 3E 
Principle”. 
Efficiency, effectiveness, and 
the full range of democratic 
and constitutional values 
(equity, transparency, ethics, 
quality, improvement, 
economic, social and 
environmental sustainability 
of the implemented policies, 
accountability). 
Internal 
relationships 
Hierarchical 
relationships. 
Separation of the 
political level from the 
administrative level 
(management). 
Overcoming the politician-
manager dichotomy. 
Decision-
making 
contents 
Specific and strict. Introduction of 
multiple criteria for 
the evaluation of 
decisions: flexibility, 
competition. 
Introduction of multiple 
criteria for the evaluation of 
decisions: flexibility, 
cooperation. 
External 
relationships 
Public monopoly – PA is 
the only provider of 
public services. 
Competition /contrast 
public-public and 
public-private. 
Cooperation among PAs, 
other public and private 
entities. 
Accountability User Client Citizen 
Planning and 
control  Input, formal results Output Output, outcome 
Governance 
model Procedural governance Corporate governance Network governance 
 Source: Iacovino, Barsanti and Cinquini, 2017. 
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In accordance with the characteristics of individual models of public administration 
presented in the Table above, the NPG concept appears not only as the most mature, 
but also as being based to the widest extent on specific public values4 (including 
democratic and constitutional ones). Bryson, Crosby and Bloomberg (2014) 
emphasize that, according to the NPG, the decision-making freedom of public 
decision-makers should be limited by law, democratic and constitutional values, and 
a broad approach to responsibility. At the same time, as emphasized in the literature 
on the subject, this responsibility should be multi-faceted, and not just hierarchical (as 
in OPA) or market (as in NPM), because public officials must take care of law, 
community values, political norms, public standards and citizens' interests (Bryson, 
Crosby and Bloomberg, 2014). Only the comprehensive fulfillment of these 
conditions allows the implementation of the idea of good public governance (GPG), 
whose attributes are open and developmental public policy, professional 
administration, acting for the public good, respect for the law, transparency of 
processes and strong civil society. 
 
3. Institutional Approach in the Theory of Economics: Traditional 
Institutionalism vs. New Institutional Economics  
 
In economic sciences, more and more attention is paid to the issues of the public sector 
in the context of the institutional approach. The terms institutionalism and institutional 
development have become synonymous with actions aimed at reformation of this 
sector in many countries, while the institutional approach in the process of 
modernization of this sector is understood as creating new principles and mechanisms 
for its functioning, especially in terms of increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. 
What is characteristic of this approach is paying special attention to institutions, both 
formal and informal, whose quality, but also mutual relations, implicate operation of 
the sector concerned. From this perspective, institutional economics is a part of 
economic sciences which, in order to explain the specificity of economic processes 
that are taking place, analyze and emphasize in this scope primarily the influence of 
non-economic factors (social, cultural, historical, legal, political factors etc.). 
 
The term new institutional economics was introduced to literature by Oliver E. 
Williamson (Williamson, 1998a; 1998b) thus emphasizing dissimilarity of the new 
approach in comparison to the so-called “old institutionalism” (classical/historical 
institutionalism) which emerged in the United States in the 20s of the twentieth 
century, and whose main representatives were two American economists, Thorstein 
B. Veblen and John R. Commons (Rosińska, 2008). The former initiated the 
behavioral approach in economic analyses, studying mainly the impact of non-formal 
 
4The term of public value was originally used by M.H. Moore (Moore, 1995). Public value 
refers to the value created by government through public services, laws, 
regulation and other actions. This term relates to the following categories: public 
satisfaction, social value from the user perspective, trust and legitimacy, public service 
quality, protecting citizens’ rights etc. 
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institutions (Veblen, 1899). The latter, John R. Commons, in his studies, focused 
mainly on formal institutions including, above all, the system of law (Commons, 
1957). 
 
The trend of new institutional economics appeared in the early 70s of the twentieth 
century, and its leading representatives were: the British economist Ronald Harry 
Coase, the American economist Oliver E. Williamson, and the American economist 
and historian Douglass C. North. Analysis of the theoretical achievements of these 
authors allows to identify specific differences between traditional institutionalism and 
the new institutional economics.  
 
Firstly, while traditional institutional economics was treated as an alternative and a 
kind of substitute for neoclassical economics, representatives of the new institutional 
economics treat their analyses solely as complementation and enrichment of 
mainstream economics (e.g., by achievements in the field of legal sciences, the theory 
of organization and management, sociology, political science, psychology etc.), at the 
same time assuming that failure to include institutional topics leads to interpretational 
errors in analyses of market processes (Woźniak-Jęchorek, 2013). These issues are 
treated in a similar way by the Polish economist Bogusław Fiedor who stresses that 
new institutional economics is a continuation and enrichment of the paradigm of 
mainstream economics – not rejection thereof. This author refers to the new 
institutional economics as a neoclassical theory of institutions which transfers the 
basic methodological assumptions as well as the categorial apparatus and analysis 
methods characteristic of mainstream economics to the area of studies on institutions 
(both formal and informal) (Fiedor, 2013).  
 
Secondly, while the doctrine of traditional institutionalism assumed that only 
institutions shape the behavior of economic entities, according to the new institutional 
economics it is the behavior of entities that influences shaping the institutions.  
 
Thirdly, the difference between the traditional and modern institutional approach is 
also reflected in the subject of research. As noted by M. Lissowska, in the former 
approach, the area of research is extensive and not very specific, and it is based also 
on non-formalized institutions such as, for instance, habits, traditions etc. In the latter 
approach, however, the subject of research are clearly defined: transactions made 
between economic entities (Lissowska, 2004). 
 
In contrast to mainstream economics, the new institutional economics is distinguished 
mainly by:  
 
i. an economic interpretation of facts which seemingly do not affect the 
economic reality, and thus a broader and more interdisciplinary approach 
to complex economic problems, noticing the weight and significance of 
institutions in the process of market exchange, as well as taking into 
account the role of transaction costs; 
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ii. abandonment of the model of full economic rationality, in favor of the so-
called limited rationality in the formula of modification of the homo 
oeconomicus conception’s assumptions, primarily in the context of 
opportunism and people’s natural tendency to make mistakes; in such 
approach, the method and results of public organizations’ operation 
should also be considered through the prism of individual preferences and 
choices (public decision-makers – politicians, consumers of public goods 
– voters, private entities that cooperate with the public sector); 
iii. abandonment of the conception of allocative effectiveness that is typical 
of neoclassical economics (understood as optimization of the relations 
between economic expenditures and results, in the given institutional 
environment) in favor of adaptive effectiveness (understood in the context 
of institutional flexibility i.e., institutions’ ability to adapt to the changing 
conditions of the environment) (North, 2010); 
iv. concentration of research on the contract/transaction category and their 
associated benefits and costs (the so-called transaction costs and, in the 
case of public sector entities, public transaction costs); in the context of 
the public sector’s specificity, it ought to be added that public (political) 
contracts are significantly different from contracts concluded on the 
market of private goods and services i.e. private contracts. Among others, 
this is due to the fact that the public (political) market is governed by 
different rules, and the decisions made on this market are a public choice 
that reflects social preferences and involves a compromise made between 
economic rationality and social justice (Zbroińska, 2009).  
 
Analysis of the possibilities of using the postulates of the new institutional economics 
in development of the public sector, first of all, requires a broader discussion of the 
issues connected with two key components that constitute pillars of the modern 
institutionalism’s conception. These are: institutions and transaction costs.  
 
4. Institutions as the Main Category of the New Institutional Economics and 
their Importance in Analyses Pertaining to the Public Sector 
  
The category of institutions is defined by Douglass C. North, who refers to them as 
certain limitations and conditions that have a major impact on interpersonal 
interactions and thus on the quality of relations that exist in the economy, also in the 
public sector as an integral component of every economic system. According to this 
author, institutions may be treated as game rules in the society i.e., specific restrictions 
and limitations as regards concluding agreements between the actors of economic life 
(in the case of public sector entities – public and public-private agreements) that shape 
the economic, social and political relations existing in the economy and that, 
consequently, ensure predictability of human behavior. North distinguishes two types 
of institutions i.e., informal ones (religion, habits, traditions, values, codes of conduct 
etc.) and formal ones (constitution, legal acts, property rights etc.)  (North, 1990; 1991; 
1994).   
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In this doctrine, institutions are treated as the key to understanding contemporary 
economic problems. This is due to the fact that, on the one hand, they constitute 
commonly accepted rules of behavior and, on the other, specific limitations of the 
choice. These limitations may also pertain to public choices and public policy, 
including shaping relations between public, social and private organizations (Rudolf, 
2015).   
 
Institutionalists point out that the key to socio-economic development is institutional 
order understood as an optimally formed institutional system. According to Michał G. 
Woźniak, it is “the determinant of an economic system’s efficiency, where this 
efficiency is materialized through its capability of economic effectiveness, 
stabilization of real processes and the economy’s functioning mechanism, economic 
growth, economic balance and generation of fair i.e. economically justified and 
socially accepted inequalities in terms of income and property” (Woźniak, 2005). 
 
In this context, the institutional coherence of an economic system is treated as a major 
determinant of its efficiency. Source literature, however, emphasizes that 
investigation into the impact of institutions on economic growth and development, 
whose nota bene important component is development of the public sector, requires 
dealing with the problems of identification and measurement of institutions. These 
problems have their origin in the following characteristics of institutions (Woźniak, 
2009): 
 
i. institutions constitute a complex category of axiological values that determine 
the rules of thought and perception of reality with varied directions and 
degrees of impact on economic decisions and effectiveness of actions;  
ii. institutions do not explicitly determine human actions, but only create a space 
for selection of goals and the means for achieving them, thus merely defining 
the boundary conditions of free choice. 
 
Considering the aspect of institutions’ effect on the economic reality, Mary M. Shirley 
divides them into two categories: (i) institutions which facilitate market exchange by 
reducing transaction costs and increasing trust; (ii) institutions which shape the system 
of state authority towards strengthening of private property and freedom of individuals 
(Shirley, 2005).  
 
From the standpoint of the research issues undertaken by the authors, the latter 
category is particularly important. This is due to the fact that in the context of the 
public sector, which is of most interest to us, the institutional approach allows to 
evaluate the quality of governance by public authorities. This is connected with the 
model of public governance referred to as good governance. These issues will be 
further discussed in the paper.  
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5. Public Governance – Institutional Dimensions of the Public Sector’s 
Operation 
 
When analyzing the operation of the public sector, the new institutional economics 
(NIE) refers to the term of governance (Przesławska, 2007). This term means: 
governing, the quality of governing, exercising authority, public governance (co-
governing), co-managing, order, coordination, and even management. Generally 
speaking, the term governance “(…) refers to all the models of rules. It is a set of 
principles assumed by an organization such as an enterprise or the state, determining 
how to rule and what principles to apply in internal and external relations between 
the stakeholders” (Valkama et al., 2004). Governance is a concept from the field of 
economic and political, or even sociological sciences (Hill and Lynn, 2004). As stated 
by Jessop (2007), it can be easily moved between the boundaries of various schools 
of thought and scientific disciplines as well as various areas of practical use. 
Therefore, it is an ambiguous and multi-contextual term.  
 
In the general sense, public governance means the government’s ability to function 
with or without the private sector, in order to drive the economy and the society toward 
achievement of common goals (Peters, 2012). According to Peters (2012), public 
governance may also be realized via the use of traditional methods of hierarchical 
nature, which means that the foundations of such co-governing are rooted in the 
conception of traditional governments (centralized and autocratic). This is the case in 
many countries. Traditional methods are used, e.g., in the sphere of taxation, 
regulation of business activity, even in countries in which there are strong tendencies 
toward governance using more interactive mechanisms. This is because the given 
model of governance may not be suitable for every political system or every public 
policy. The cited author notes that the term governance has become popular partly 
because it constitutes an alternative to traditional hierarchical forms of ruling a nation 
state, especially in centralized systems. The main logic behind governing without a 
government is that self-organizing networks of actors can supply/constitute 
alternative, more effective, human/humanitarian and democratic models of 
governance (Peters, 2012). Table 2 presents the main differences between the 
traditional way of governing by a government, and public governance. 
 
Rotberg (2004) believes that “public governance is good” when it allows to allocate 
and manage the resources so as to satisfy the collective needs (solve collective 
problems) or, in other words, when the government effectively provides public goods 
of appropriate quality. Therefore, governments should be evaluated in terms of both 
quality and quantity of goods supplied. Supply of public goods as part of public 
policies is based on such principles as: human rights, democratization and democracy, 
transparency, participation of decentralized authority, good public administration, 
responsibility/accountability, rule of law, effectiveness, equality, strategic vision 
(Cheema, 2005). 
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Table 2. Government vs. public governance 
Issue Government Public governance 
Definition Authority/body that makes formal 
political decisions sanctioned by 
formal institutional rules 
Formal and informal exercise of 
authority aimed at achieving a 
consensus in specific situations 
Actors A small number of participants, 
mostly public entities 
A large number of participating 
actors, public entities, private entities, 
civil society 
Focus on Organizational structures and 
institutions 
Processes, policies, results 
Structures Closed systems, territorial limitations 
on exercise of authority, compulsory 
participation 
Open systems, functional division of 
authority, voluntary participation 
 Hierarchy Networks and partnerships 
Decision-making 
process 
Narrow scope of consultations, no 
cooperation or involvement of 
citizens in the process of exercising 
authority or in implementing/realizing 
public policy 
More extensive consultations, 
cooperation between actors in 
defining and realizing the public 
policy 
Implementation 
tools 
Top-down tools. Mostly formal.  
 
Often informal tools that create 
conditions and incentives to accept 
formal decisions 
Methods of 
interaction 
Hierarchical exercise of authority, 
conflict relations, confidential/secret 
system of governance and control 
direct provision of services 
 
Relations based on consultation and 
cooperation, a transparent and open 
public administration,  
an inclusive role of public 
administration 
Decisions Fixed and specific Based on criteria and principles 
oriented toward autonomous decisions 
External 
consequences/eff
ects/results of 
decisions 
Results imposed in a top-down 
manner, prohibitions and obligations 
 
Requirements not imposed top-down, 
but rather incentives and conditions 
determining the behavior of various 
actors 
Source: Monteduro et al., 2013. 
 
The term good governance was first used in documents of the World Bank in the early 
90s of the twentieth century. World Bank’s definition of 1992 described good 
governance using the following qualities: an open and developmental policy, 
professional administration, acting for the public good, rules of the law, transparency 
of processes, a strong civil society (Schöler and Walther, 2003). It ought to be added 
that, in various texts, different values defining the idea of good governance are 
specified. For instance, UN documents mention eight principles associated with this 
formula of public administration’s operation. These are: participation, social 
consensus, accountability of public authority, transparency, timeliness, effectiveness 
and efficiency, social justice, rule of law (United Nations, 2009).  
 
Good governance allows to reduce corruption. It promotes gender equality, has a 
positive impact on sustainable development, allows citizens to enjoy personal 
freedoms, delivers tools for combating poverty, privation, fear and violence. UN 
perceives good governance as a participative, transparent and accountable system. It 
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encompasses state institutions and their actions as well as the private sector and civil 
society organizations. In practice, such rules should translate into “strengthening of 
democratic institutions” (Cheema, 2005). Moreover, good public governance 
provides the basis for good corporate governance. Good public governance is the 
foundation for stable and effective economies. Those who question the possibility of 
defining conditions of good governance are inclined toward creating/defining 
conditions of the good enough governance model. As a conception, good enough 
governance suggests that not all the deficits/shortcomings of public governance must 
be immediately remedied, and that building of institutions and capabilities of the state 
requires time (Grindle, 2011). Grindle proposes that, within the frameworks of good 
enough governance, attention is paid to the minimum conditions of governance that 
enable political and economic development, and a solution that may be used in 
practice is not necessarily presented (Grindle, 2011). 
 
6. Measurement of Governance 
 
In economic terms, the method of governing in an economy may be considered as a 
pure public good. “The «created» quality of governance does not require that 
additional costs connected with its «consumption» be incurred by an additional 
member of the society, nor can any member of the given society be deprived of the 
opportunity to use it” (Miłaszewicz, 2015). According to Rodrik, “(…) governance 
has an instrumental value in the scope in which it gives manufacturers and households 
a greater transparency on the rules of the game, and – to investors – a greater 
certainty that they will be able to get return rates proportionate to their efforts” 
(Rodrik, 2008). If we assume such a way of understanding this term, governance 
becomes an instrument that allows to achieve the primary goal of operation of the 
entire socio-economic system. Then, quality of this governance ought to be considered 
to be a result that characterizes actions of the public sector, whereas evaluation of this 
quality should be assumed as the measure of results achieved by this sector 
(Miłaszewicz, 2014).  
 
However, measurement of governance which, in recent years, has become the subject 
of many empirical analyses, poses many problems. Application of statistical tools to 
evaluate governance quality is not easy because these actions are often immeasurable. 
In the opinion of Przesławska, governance quality indicators do not measure the 
objective state, which is probably indefinable, but rather “(…) the perception of the 
given phenomenon in the selected group of respondents, e.g., experts of the given field 
or companies operating in the given country. Here, a certain institutional model is the 
point of reference (…)” (Przesławska, 2007). Therefore, many institutions have made 
attempts to prepare relevant models. The most elaborate governance quality measures, 
based on aggregated data and international comparative studies, have been published 
by the World Bank, the European Central Bank, the International Institute for 
Management Development (IMD) and the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
(Wojciechowski and Podgórniak-Krzykacz, 2008). Each of the proposed methods for 
this evaluation has its advantages and disadvantages. 
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Still, the leading institution in terms of construction of quality indicators is the World 
Bank. The first empirical study concerning this measurement was published in 1996 
by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). The study covered 178 countries. 
The next study was published in 1999 in the World Bank’s Policy Research Working 
Paper (Kaufmann et al., 1999). The analysis concerned 199 countries and was 
prepared on the basis of 300 indicators. Its authors aggregated individual measures of 
governance quality into six categories that encompass the key dimensions of 
governance quality (Kaufmann et al., 1999): 
 
i. voice and accountability – covers measurement of political rights, civil 
liberties and human rights; 
ii. political stability – means measurement of the probability of 
destabilization, violent threats and changes in the government through 
possibly unconstitutional acts of violence, terrorism included; 
iii. government effectiveness – covers measurement of the public 
administration’s professionalism and the quality of public services 
provided; 
iv. regulatory quality – pertains to measurement of the degree of 
interference of the public-administrative factor in the market economy; 
this indicator concentrates on the perceived occurrence of a policy that 
is unfavorable for the market; 
v. rule of law – this indicator evaluates operational efficiency of the 
judiciary, the quality of contracts and protection of property rights; 
vi. control of corruption – this indicator measures the perception of 
corruption understood as using public authority for private purposes5. 
 
The way in which the above categories are put into groups does not aspire to the status 
of a precise definition of governance quality. It is, rather, a reflection of the author’s 
views on “a coherent and useful organization of data, consistent with the common 
notion of governance quality (a model of unobservable components)” (Przesławska, 
2007).  
 
Based on aggregated measures, a governance indicator was designed that assumes 
values from -2.5 to 2.5. The higher the value, the higher the level of development. The 
latest Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) report, published by the World Bank, 
covers the years 1996-2018 (World Bank, The Worldwide Governance Indicators – 
WGI). The designed indicators are based on several hundred individual variables that 
measure subjective perception of governance quality. They were prepared on the basis 
of more than 30 separate sources of data, and pertain to more than 200 countries.  
 
 
5Originally, this category was defined as: Graft (i.e. bribery). Only in 2002 it was changed to 
control of corruption (Wojciechowski and Podgórniak-Krzykacz, 2008). 
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According to some researchers, the weakness of WGI lies in being based solely on 
subjective data and, therefore, the possibility of formulating biased opinions and 
discrepancy between respondents. However, in many cases, objective data, as 
emphasized by Zawojska, (2012), may be even more inadequate due to extreme 
incompatibilities between the de jure and de facto situations. Other researchers 
(Glaeser et al., 2004) criticize WGI for failing to relate to the permanent elements of 
an institution’s definition proposed by North (1990) and for measuring results of an 
institution (i.e., policy choices) rather than the formal limitations of executive 
authority. According to Kurtz and Schrank (2007), WGI’s deficiency is the mutual 
correlation of subindices. 
 
7. Influence of Governance Quality on Economic Growth, the Case of the 
EU-28: An Empirical Model6 
 
Nowadays, emphasis is placed on the considerable influence of institutional factors, 
pertaining to governance quality, on economic growth and prosperity. Individual 
countries develop at different speeds, and this can be significantly influenced by the 
quality of governance (via various factors) (Bayar, 2016).  
 
The authors of the research made an attempt to examine the statistical relationship 
between institutional factors of the so-called good governance, and the level of 
economic growth in 28 member states of the European Union. Therefore, it was 
assumed that the quality of governance has a positive effect on the level of GDP per 
capita in the studied countries. The main source of knowledge were the World Bank’s 
data. Six indicators proposed by this institution were assumed as the measures of 
governance quality (The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI).  
 
WGI represent aggregated indicators based on several hundred variables that evaluate 
the perception of institutions (Table 3), collected from dozens separate sources of data 
gathered by 30 organizations from around the world. The indicators of governance 
quality (or the state’s institutional efficiency) assumed for the study reflect the 
processes of selecting, monitoring and changing public authorities (Voice and 
Accountability VA), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (PS), the 
public authorities’ ability to effectively formulate and implement the right decisions 
(Government Effectiveness GE, and Regulatory Quality RQ) as well as the respect of 
citizens/the state for institutions which govern mutual relations (Rule of Law RL and 
Control of Corruption CC) (Kaufmann et al., 2010; Zawojska, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 See: Poniatowicz, Dziemianowowicz, Kargol-Wasiluk, 2017. 
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Table 3. Description of Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Institutional indicators Area of measurement 
Democratic process 
VA 
Voice and accountability 
Perception of the extent to which citizens of the given country 
may participate in electing and dismissing the authorities, as 
well as the extent of freedom of speech, freedom of 
association and independence of media 
PS 
Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Subjective evaluations of the likelihood of destabilization or 
overthrowing of the government (authorities) by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including internal 
violence and acts of terrorism 
An honest and effective government 
GE 
Government Effectiveness 
Perception of the quality of public services, quality of the civil 
service and its independence from political pressure, the 
quality of formulating and implementing policies, as well as 
the credibility of political commitments made by the 
government 
RQ 
Regulatory Quality 
Perception of the government’s (state’s) ability to create and 
implement proper policies and regulations that enable and 
promote development of the private sector (e.g. absence of 
price controls, proper banking supervision) 
RL 
Rule of Law 
 
Perception of entities’ degree of confidence and adherence to 
the norms of social life, in particular, the quality of enforcing 
contracts, property rights, police and courts of law, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence 
CC 
Control of corruption (i.e. 
combating corruption) 
Perception of the extent to which public authority is used for 
private gains, including not only minor and major forms of 
corruption, but also whether the state is being appropriated or 
‘captured’ by elites and private interest groups 
Source: Kaufmann et al., 2010; Zawojska, 2012. 
 
The year 2018 was chosen for the purposes of the analysis because the most recent 
(available) data come from that period. In order to serve as a measure of the gross 
domestic product, GDP was assumed as an average GDP per capita for the EU-28 
(the so-called dependent variable). Selected indicators of governance quality for the 
EU-28 (independent variables) and the level of GDP per capita in 2018 are presented 
in Appendices 1–7. The following table (Table 4) presents the variables used in the 
empirical analysis, together with the applied abbreviations and data sources.  
 
The following model of multiple regression was considered: 
GDP = β0 + β1VA+ β2PSV + β3GE + β4RQ + β5RL + β6CC + Ɛ 
 
β 0...6 – parameters of the model; 
Ɛ – random component. 
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Table 4. Variables used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Explanation Source of data:  
GDP/FRPGDP GDP per capita EUROSTAT 
VA/FRPVA Voice and Accountability The Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators Database 
The World Bank 
PSV/FRPPSV Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
GE/FRPGE Government Effectiveness 
RQ/FRPRQ Regulatory Quality 
RL/FRPRL Rule of Law 
CC/FRPCC Control of Corruption 
Note: FRP – fractional rank as %. 
Source: Own study. 
 
The IBM SPSS Statistics (version 25) program was used for empirical analyses. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for raw data and for ranged data, 
whereas the correlation matrix is presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
 VA PSV GE RQ RL CC GDP 
N Valid 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.0882 .6714 1.0832 1.1732 1.0911 .9939 30548.57 
Median 1.0900 .7500 1.1000 1.1800 1.0550 .7450 24900.00 
Standard deviation .38853 .37034 .55874 .49534 .60766 .79615 19793.272 
Skewness -.446 -.117 -.337 -.054 -.159 .187 1.715 
Standard error of 
skewness 
.441 .441 .441 .441 .441 .441 .441 
Kurtosis -.549 -.770 -.278 -1.201 -1.104 -1.444 4.023 
Standard error of 
kurtosis 
.858 .858 .858 .858 .858 .858 .858 
Minimum .32 .05 -.25 .30 -.03 -.15 7980 
Maximum 1.61 1.37 1.98 2.02 2.05 2.21 98640 
Source: Own study. 
 
When analyzing descriptive statistics of independent variables VA, PSV, GE, RQ, RL 
CC and of the GDP dependent variable, one could conclude that, due to similar values 
of the mean and median in all the cases, the distributions of these variables are normal. 
The kurtosis, which is a measure of flattening, is positive for GDP which means that 
its distribution is slimmer than in the case of the normal distribution. As regards the 
other variables, the distributions are more flattened. The skewness coefficient is 
negative in all the cases (except for CC and GDP), which indicates left-sidedness of 
the distribution.  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
 FRPVA FRPPSV FRPGE FRPRQ FRPRL FRPCC FRPGDP 
N Valid 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 
Median 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 51.7857 50.8929 50.8929 51.7857 
Standard 
deviation 
29.35435 29.35838 29.37446 29.37044 29.37044 29.36642 29.37848 
Skewness -.005 .000 .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 
Standard error of 
skewness 
.441 .441 .441 .441 .441 .441 .441 
Kurtosis -1.218 -1.198 -1.200 -1.205 -1.198 -1.198 -1.200 
Standard error of 
kurtosis 
.858 .858 .858 .858 .858 .858 .858 
Minimum 5.36 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 3.57 
Maximum 96.43 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Own study. 
 
Due to the high skewness of the distribution for GDP and the value of kurtosis, 
normalization (standardization) of variables was conducted, leading to the results 
presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 7. Correlation matrix 
 FRPVA FRPPSV FRPGE FRPRQ FRPRL FRPCC FRPGDP 
FRPVA Pearson Correlation 1 .370 .911** .876** .915** .940** .930** 
Significance (2-tailed)  .053 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPPSV Pearson Correlation .370 1 .440* .411* .459* .408* .376* 
Significance (2-tailed) .053  .019 .030 .014 .031 .049 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPGE Pearson Correlation .911** .440* 1 .886** .963** .950** .838** 
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .019  .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPRQ Pearson Correlation .876** .411* .886** 1 .906** .889** .801** 
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .030 .000  .000 .000 .000 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPRL Pearson Correlation .915** .459* .963** .906** 1 .946** .849** 
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .014 .000 .000  .000 .000 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPCC Pearson Correlation .940** .408* .950** .889** .946** 1 .868** 
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .031 .000 .000 .000  .000 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
FRPGDP Pearson Correlation .930** .376* .838** .801** .849** .868** 1 
Significance (2-tailed) .000 .049 .000 .000 .000 .000  
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tiled). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tiled). 
Source: Own study. 
 
In order to determine the relationship between variables, Pearson's correlation 
coefficient (Table 7) was used. It can assume positive and negative values ranging 
from -1 to 1. Negative values indicate occurrence of a negative dependence (as the 
values of the independent variable increase, the values of the dependent variable 
decrease). Positive values confirm occurrence of a positive dependence between 
variables (as the values of the independent variable increase, the values of the 
dependent variable increase too).  
 
Based on the analysis of data from the correlation matrix, PSV was excluded as an 
indicator which is not significantly correlated to GDP. Next, a regression analysis was 
performed, trying to find the answer to the question of which governance indicators 
influence the economic growth in the EU-28 to the greatest extent. Therefore, in 
further analyses, the following model was subjected to verification: 
 
GDP = β0 + β1VA+ β2GE + β3RQ + β4RL + β5CC + Ɛ 
 
The model of multiple regression was chosen for the analysis. Parameters of the model 
were estimated using the least squares method (OLS). In the regression equation, the 
regression coefficients (β) represent independent contributions of each independent 
variable to forecasting the GDP dependent variable. After carrying out repeated 
analyses, the following results were obtained: 
 
Table 8. Results of the analysis of variance, which determines matching of the 
regression model 
Anovaa 
Model Sum Sq df Mean Sq F 
Significan
ce 
1 Regressio
n 
20138.299 1 10069.259 165.419 .000b 
Residual 3165.272 26 121.741   
Total 23303.571 27    
a. Dependent Variable: FRPGDP 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FRPVA 
Source: Own study. 
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Table 9. Coefficients of the regression model 
Coefficientsa 
 Model 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Significance 
Linearity Statistics  
B 
Standa
rd 
Error  Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Consta
nt) 
3.606 4.287 
 
.841 .408 
  
PRSVA .930 .072 .930 12.8
62 
.000 
1 1 
a. Dependent Variable: FRPGDP 
Beta (β) – correlation strength 
Source: Own study. 
 
Table 10. Summary of the model – value of the multiple correlation coefficient and 
the R-squared statistics 
Model – Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .930a .864 .859 11.03364 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FRPVA 
Source: Own study. 
 
Therefore, the estimated model is: 
 
PRSGDP (±11.03) = 0.93 (±0.07) FRPVA 
 
A multiple regression analysis was carried out, in which the explained variable was 
GDP per capita in the EU-28 as an average GDP per capita for all the member states, 
and the explaining variables was VA. The proposed regression model transpired to be 
well matched to the data of F (1;26)  = 165.42 p ˂ 0.01. Based on the analysis of 
regression coefficients, it may be concluded that GDP per capita in the EU-28 is 
strongly and positively associated with VA (beta = 0.93, p < 0.01). This means that a 
country characterized by a high level of GDP per capita is also characterized by a 
high level of VA. The tested model explains 86% of the variability of the dependent 
variable. The independent variable, which was included in the model, have a positive 
effect on the dependent variable.  
 
The obtained model presents the relationship between GDP and such dimension of 
governance quality as voice and accountability. Extension of the analysis could prove 
that, at the given stage of economic development, other dimensions of governance 
quality have a greater significance. However, if you use the linear regression model, 
you can build five one-factor models (one-factor regression model) (Table 11). 
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Table 11. One-factor regression models 
PRSGDP = 0.93 FRPVA 
PRSGDP = 0.84 FRPGE 
PRSGDP = 0.80 FRPRQ 
PRSGDP = 0.85 FRPRL 
PRSGDP = 0.87 FRPCC 
Source: Own study. 
 
Results obtained in the empirical study are, to a considerable extent, convergent with 
the results of the study conducted by Bayar in transition countries (Bayar, 2016). 
 
8. Conclusions  
 
The new institutional economics assumes that modern economic processes are 
determined by various kinds of institutions. Hence, an important role in dynamizing 
the processes of socio-economic development is attributed to the quality of 
governance, which is often expressed in institutional terms. Studies are undertaken 
which, on the one hand, enable identification of its dimensions and, on the other, 
demonstrate the impact of the governance quality on the rate of growth and the level 
of economic development.  
 
The conducted theoretical study falls within the  boundaries of the new institutional 
economics trend, providing the basis for further advancement of research in reference 
to the public sector, especially as far as governance quality is concerned. Key 
theoretical concepts in this context, which are consistent with the paradigm of the new 
institutional economics, include the public choice theory (along with constitutional 
economics and the economic theory of democracy that were derived from it) as well 
as other theories i.e. the agency theory, the transaction costs theory and the property 
rights theory. 
 
As the conducted empirical study has demonstrated, changes in operation of the public 
sector, in relation to governance quality, exert an influence on economic results of the 
given country such as the level of GDP per capita. The conducted analyses resulted 
in positively verifying the model of relations between dimensions of governance 
quality and the pace of economic growth in the EU-28. Based on correlation studies, 
out of the six analyzed dimensions of governance quality i.e., voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law and control of corruption, only political stability transpired not to be correlated to 
the level of GDP per capita in the studied economies, where the individual dimensions 
are, to a varying degree, correlated to the explained variable.  
 
The empirical model of dependences between the studied values has confirmed the 
assumptions of the authors about the positive effect of Voice and Accountability (VA). 
Based on the analysis of regression coefficients, it may be concluded that GDP per 
capita in the EU-28 is strongly and positively associated with VA (beta = 0.93, p < 
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0.01). This means that a country characterized by a high level of GDP per capita is 
also characterized by a high level of VA. The tested model explains 86% of the 
variability of the dependent variable. 
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1. Voice and Accountability 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.39 1.43 1.40 1.45 1.46 1.39 1.38 1.34 1.34 1.38 
Belgium 1.35 1.36 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.37 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.40 
Bulgaria 0.56 0.53 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.32 
Cyprus 1.07 1.02 1.05 1.02 0.98 1.02 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.04 
Czechia 1.03 1.01 1.02 0.97 0.98 1.03 1.04 1.02 0.97 0.93 
Germany 1.33 1.30 1.35 1.39 1.41 1.44 1.42 1.36 1.39 1.42 
Denmark 1.54 1.54 1.55 1.67 1.67 1.52 1.55 1.54 1.52 1.61 
Spain 1.18 1.12 1.09 1.06 0.99 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.06 
Estonia 1.09 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.21 1.21 
Finland 1.47 1.49 1.51 1.60 1.57 1.54 1.54 1.53 1.55 1.61 
France 1.24 1.20 1.17 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.21 1.14 1.15 1.18 
United Kingdom 1.30 1.29 1.30 1.34 1.33 1.28 1.30 1.29 1.33 1.38 
Greece 0.89 0.90 0.82 0.70 0.69 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.71 0.86 
Croatia 0.49 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.52 0.51 0.50 
Hungary 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.75 0.74 0.55 0.56 0.40 0.37 0.32 
Ireland 1.35 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.29 1.29 1.32 
Italy 1.03 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.95 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.05 
Lithuania 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.92 
Luxembourg 1.56 1.57 1.60 1.65 1.63 1.55 1.55 1.50 1.52 1.57 
Latvia 0.85 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.81 
Malta 1.15 1.17 1.14 1.17 1.16 1.18 1.20 1.20 1.17 1.12 
Netherlands 1.46 1.45 1.54 1.61 1.57 1.55 1.56 1.54 1.57 1.60 
Poland 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.06 1.00 1.11 1.04 0.84 0.78 0.72 
Portugal 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.03 1.07 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.21 1.20 
Romania 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.46 
Slovakia 0.88 0.91 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.88 
Slovenia 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.00 0.99 
Sweden 1.55 1.54 1.61 1.69 1.66 1.61 1.57 1.56 1.58 1.61 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 
GEO/TIME  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.19 1.15 1.19 1.34 1.36 1.27 1.14 0.91 1.05 0.92 
Belgium 0.82 0.81 0.95 0.92 0.94 0.70 0.59 0.44 0.43 0.41 
Bulgaria 0.35 0.36 0.30 0.38 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.33 0.42 
Cyprus 0.39 0.45 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.54 0.54 
Czechia 0.91 0.99 1.11 1.05 1.08 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.04 
Germany 0.86 0.80 0.84 0.78 0.93 0.93 0.70 0.68 0.59 0.60 
Denmark 1.00 1.04 1.10 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.96 
Spain -0.47 -0.32 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.24 0.25 0.41 0.28 0.25 
Estonia 0.57 0.66 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.78 0.62 0.67 0.65 0.60 
Finland 1.46 1.42 1.39 1.40 1.39 1.28 1.04 1.00 1.08 0.92 
France 0.51 0.68 0.60 0.55 0.45 0.30 0.11 -0.10 0.28 0.11 
United Kingdom 0.12 0.41 0.35 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.52 0.36 0.33 0.05 
Greece -0.21 -0.13 -0.10 -0.22 -0.17 -0.14 -0.23 -0.12 -0.07 0.09 
Croatia 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.77 
Hungary 0.54 0.69 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.67 0.75 0.65 0.81 0.76 
Ireland 1.06 1.02 0.95 0.94 0.90 1.05 0.91 0.85 1.00 1.03 
Italy 0.35 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.31 
Lithuania 0.63 0.72 0.67 0.79 0.96 0.74 0.76 0.83 0.78 0.75 
Luxembourg 1.45 1.46 1.32 1.33 1.34 1.38 1.44 1.42 1.33 1.37 
Latvia 0.35 0.53 0.32 0.45 0.59 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.42 
Malta 1.25 1.25 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.13 1.06 1.08 1.25 1.29 
Netherlands 0.94 0.94 1.11 1.19 1.14 1.05 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.87 
Poland 0.94 1.02 1.07 1.05 0.97 0.84 0.87 0.51 0.52 0.55 
Portugal 0.79 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.92 0.97 1.12 1.14 
Romania 0.36 0.27 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.28 0.06 0.06 
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Slovakia 0.92 1.05 0.97 1.09 1.12 1.04 0.87 0.72 0.91 0.75 
Slovenia 0.93 0.87 0.97 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.87 0.91 
Sweden 1.09 1.09 1.23 1.17 1.13 1.07 0.95 1.02 0.98 0.91 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 3. Government effectiveness 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.67 1.84 1.62 1.58 1.59 1.57 1.48 1.51 1.46 1.45 
Belgium 1.57 1.58 1.66 1.60 1.61 1.38 1.44 1.33 1.18 1.17 
Bulgaria 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.30 0.26 0.27 
Cyprus 1.42 1.53 1.56 1.39 1.37 1.14 1.05 0.96 0.92 0.92 
Czechia 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.89 1.02 1.05 1.04 1.01 0.92 
Germany 1.58 1.57 1.55 1.59 1.54 1.73 1.74 1.73 1.72 1.62 
Denmark 2.23 2.10 2.10 1.98 1.99 1.82 1.85 1.88 1.80 1.87 
Spain 0.95 0.99 1.03 1.12 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.12 1.03 1.00 
Estonia 1.01 1.09 1.08 0.95 0.97 1.02 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.19 
Finland 2.23 2.23 2.24 2.22 2.17 2.00 1.81 1.83 1.94 1.98 
France 1.48 1.43 1.36 1.34 1.48 1.40 1.44 1.41 1.35 1.48 
United Kingdom 1.51 1.57 1.56 1.55 1.50 1.63 1.74 1.60 1.41 1.34 
Greece 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.32 0.46 0.40 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.34 
Croatia 0.60 0.62 0.56 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.51 0.49 0.57 0.46 
Hungary 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.50 0.46 0.52 0.49 
Ireland 1.34 1.35 1.46 1.55 1.49 1.60 1.53 1.33 1.29 1.42 
Italy 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.37 0.45 0.53 0.50 0.41 
Lithuania 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.83 0.83 0.98 1.18 1.07 0.97 1.07 
Luxembourg 1.75 1.72 1.75 1.67 1.63 1.65 1.72 1.69 1.68 1.78 
Latvia 0.62 0.71 0.70 0.84 0.89 0.96 1.09 1.01 0.90 1.04 
Malta 1.17 1.19 1.20 1.25 1.26 1.03 0.85 0.96 1.00 0.97 
Netherlands 1.74 1.73 1.79 1.81 1.78 1.82 1.83 1.83 1.85 1.85 
Poland 0.53 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.66 
Portugal 1.16 1.01 0.95 1.04 1.23 0.99 1.22 1.21 1.33 1.21 
Romania -0.36 -0.27 -0.33 -0.31 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.17 -0.17 -0.25 
Slovakia 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.88 0.84 0.89 0.80 0.71 
Slovenia 1.15 1.03 0.99 1.03 1.01 1.01 0.97 1.13 1.17 1.13 
Sweden 2.05 2.00 1.97 1.96 1.91 1.80 1.82 1.77 1.84 1.83 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 4. Regulatory Quality 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.45 1.45 1.38 1.52 1.49 1.49 1.40 1.44 1.44 1.54 
Belgium 1.31 1.29 1.24 1.23 1.29 1.16 1.29 1.34 1.24 1.23 
Bulgaria 0.67 0.65 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.63 0.58 
Cyprus 1.36 1.42 1.24 1.13 0.92 1.10 1.06 1.05 1.03 1.02 
Czechia 1.31 1.30 1.20 1.06 1.09 1.01 1.10 0.99 1.23 1.26 
Germany 1.52 1.57 1.55 1.54 1.55 1.70 1.72 1.82 1.78 1.75 
Denmark 1.88 1.88 1.91 1.81 1.81 1.69 1.73 1.58 1.62 1.68 
Spain 1.19 1.16 1.07 0.95 0.94 0.75 0.81 1.01 0.94 0.95 
Estonia 1.40 1.39 1.39 1.42 1.45 1.68 1.67 1.70 1.64 1.56 
Finland 1.81 1.88 1.82 1.83 1.85 1.88 1.84 1.82 1.82 1.79 
France 1.22 1.31 1.16 1.13 1.16 1.08 1.13 1.07 1.16 1.17 
United Kingdom 1.58 1.73 1.66 1.65 1.77 1.83 1.85 1.76 1.71 1.76 
Greece 0.84 0.64 0.50 0.53 0.63 0.33 0.41 0.15 0.24 0.30 
Croatia 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.46 0.46 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.42 0.45 
Hungary 1.08 1.02 1.03 0.99 0.91 0.75 0.77 0.60 0.65 0.60 
Ireland 1.70 1.62 1.60 1.57 1.58 1.76 1.82 1.74 1.59 1.60 
Italy 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.75 0.78 0.64 0.73 0.71 0.70 0.67 
Lithuania 0.95 0.96 0.93 1.12 1.15 1.19 1.28 1.14 1.16 1.11 
Luxembourg 1.65 1.68 1.87 1.77 1.78 1.63 1.66 1.72 1.69 1.76 
Latvia 0.99 0.98 0.96 1.02 1.04 1.17 1.09 1.08 1.15 1.19 
Malta 1.37 1.43 1.34 1.33 1.30 1.08 1.17 1.16 1.28 1.34 
Netherlands 1.70 1.73 1.81 1.75 1.77 1.77 1.80 1.98 2.05 2.02 
Poland 0.95 0.98 0.93 0.96 1.05 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.88 
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Portugal 0.99 0.72 0.63 0.83 0.80 0.75 0.96 0.84 0.91 0.89 
Romania 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.49 0.45 
Slovakia 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.05 0.93 0.89 0.79 0.89 0.82 0.81 
Slovenia 0.92 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.58 0.69 
Sweden 1.65 1.66 1.90 1.91 1.91 1.81 1.82 1.85 1.80 1.80 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 5. Rule of law 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.78 1.80 1.80 1.86 1.85 1.95 1.86 1.81 1.81 1.88 
Belgium 1.38 1.39 1.42 1.43 1.44 1.52 1.46 1.39 1.34 1.37 
Bulgaria -0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 
Cyprus 1.21 1.22 1.07 1.10 1.04 1.08 1.04 0.72 0.88 0.75 
Czechia 0.96 0.95 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.15 1.15 1.04 1.12 1.05 
Germany 1.66 1.63 1.62 1.66 1.65 1.86 1.79 1.62 1.61 1.63 
Denmark 1.92 1.90 1.92 1.87 1.90 2.10 2.04 1.91 1.86 1.83 
Spain 1.16 1.19 1.20 1.06 1.02 0.95 0.90 0.98 1.01 0.97 
Estonia 1.13 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.20 1.37 1.33 1.23 1.28 1.24 
Finland 1.97 1.97 1.95 1.95 1.94 2.10 2.06 2.02 2.03 2.05 
France 1.45 1.52 1.45 1.45 1.43 1.47 1.41 1.41 1.44 1.44 
UK 1.74 1.76 1.65 1.72 1.71 1.89 1.81 1.69 1.68 1.64 
Greece 0.65 0.63 0.57 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.27 0.11 0.08 0.15 
Croatia 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.32 0.20 0.41 0.33 0.32 
Hungary 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.62 0.58 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.53 0.56 
Ireland 1.75 1.77 1.76 1.73 1.73 1.78 1.77 1.52 1.43 1.46 
Italy 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.25 
Lithuania 0.73 0.78 0.77 0.85 0.84 0.94 1.01 1.03 0.99 0.96 
Luxembourg 1.83 1.85 1.83 1.80 1.82 1.91 1.87 1.76 1.74 1.81 
Latvia 0.81 0.79 0.75 0.79 0.77 0.87 0.79 0.96 0.93 0.96 
Malta 1.48 1.42 1.29 1.34 1.33 1.19 1.14 1.00 1.14 1.05 
Netherlands 1.81 1.82 1.82 1.86 1.84 1.98 1.94 1.89 1.83 1.82 
Poland 0.63 0.68 0.77 0.78 0.82 0.84 0.80 0.64 0.47 0.43 
Portugal 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.07 1.06 1.14 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.14 
Romania 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.36 0.39 0.33 
Slovakia 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.57 0.53 
Slovenia 1.08 1.01 1.05 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.08 1.02 1.06 
Sweden 1.97 1.96 1.94 1.95 1.97 1.99 2.04 2.02 1.94 1.90 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 6. Control  of corruption 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 1.70 1.59 1.43 1.39 1.55 1.47 1.52 1.55 1.53 1.60 
Belgium 1.46 1.53 1.58 1.61 1.67 1.57 1.57 1.64 1.50 1.51 
Bulgaria -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.25 -0.26 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 
Cyprus 0.91 0.97 0.87 1.25 1.25 1.08 1.01 0.83 0.78 0.64 
Czechia  0.39 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.23 0.37 0.43 0.54 0.57 0.50 
Germany 1.76 1.78 1.74 1.83 1.81 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.84 1.95 
Denmark 2.45 2.36 2.40 2.38 2.40 2.25 2.21 2.23 2.19 2.15 
Spain 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.13 0.90 0.63 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.61 
Estonia 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.10 1.19 1.30 1.29 1.27 1.24 1.51 
Finland 2.25 2.16 2.20 2.24 2.20 2.17 2.28 2.24 2.22 2.21 
France 1.44 1.47 1.53 1.46 1.33 1.31 1.31 1.40 1.26 1.32 
UK 1.63 1.60 1.62 1.67 1.70 1.74 1.88 1.90 1.84 1.83 
Greece 0.07 -0.06 -0.10 -0.19 -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.07 
Croatia -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.19 0.13 
Hungary 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.05 
Ireland 1.76 1.69 1.56 1.46 1.54 1.60 1.62 1.58 1.55 1.55 
Italy 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.24 
Lithuania 0.23 0.38 0.33 0.39 0.43 0.56 0.62 0.71 0.55 0.50 
Luxembourg 1.97 2.05 2.16 2.12 2.12 2.07 2.10 2.10 1.99 2.09 
Latvia 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.54 0.33 
Malta 0.77 0.79 0.77 0.94 0.98 0.85 0.90 0.72 0.74 0.58 
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Netherlands 2.13 2.14 2.12 2.12 2.05 1.99 1.88 1.91 1.87 2.01 
Poland 0.45 0.50 0.56 0.66 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.64 
Portugal 1.09 1.09 1.11 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.87 0.85 
Romania -0.26 -0.23 -0.21 -0.26 -0.19 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.12 
Slovakia 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.22 0.36 
Slovenia 1.06 0.92 0.95 0.84 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.87 
Sweden 2.25 2.27 2.20 2.31 2.29 2.15 2.24 2.19 2.14 2.14 
Source: World Bank. The Worldwide Governance Indicators – WGI. Retrieved from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home (16.01.2020). 
 
Appendix 7. GDP per capita (euro) 
GEO/TIME 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Austria 34 530 35 390 36 970 37 820 38 210 38 990 39 890 40 880 42 100 43 640 
Belgium 32 090 33 330 34 060 34 770 35 210 35 950 36 960 37 980 39 240 40 240 
Bulgaria 4 930 5 050 5 610 5 750 5 770 5 940 6 360 6 820 7 390 7 980 
Cyprus 23 110 23 400 23 270 22 500 20 880 20 420 21 030 22 160 23 320 24 290 
Czechia 14 170 14 900 15 630 15 360 15 010 14 880 15 980 16 690 18 100 19 530 
Germany 30 390 31 940 33 550 34 130 34 860 36 150 37 090 38 060 39 260 40 340 
Denmark 41 880 43 840 44 500 45 530 46 100 47 090 48 050 49 420 50 700 52 010 
Spain 23 060 23 040 22 760 22 050 21 900 22 220 23 220 23 980 24 970 25 730 
Estonia 10 640 11 150 12 660 13 620 14 420 15 340 15 820 16 490 18 070 19 740 
Finland 34 040 35 080 36 750 37 130 37 570 37 880 38 590 39 580 40 990 42 500 
France 29 930 30 690 31 510 31 820 32 080 32 420 33 020 33 430 34 220 34 980 
United Kingdom 27 900 29 750 30 220 33 150 32 730 35 760 40 560 37 090 35 780 36 480 
Greece 21 390 20 320 18 640 17 310 16 480 16 400 16 380 16 380 16 760 17 220 
Croatia 10 460 10 500 10 460 10 290 10 270 10 250 10 600 11 170 11 890 12 620 
Hungary 9 420 9 900 10 180 10 050 10 310 10 730 11 400 11 740 12 830 13 690 
Ireland 37 470 36 790 37 310 38 090 38 890 41 870 55 970 57 210 61 870 66 670 
Italy 26 470 26 930 27 450 26 920 26 590 26 770 27 260 27 970 28 690 29 220 
Lithuania 8 520 9 030 10 310 11 160 11 830 12 460 12 850 13 560 14 940 16 160 
Luxembourg 74 220 79 160 83 100 83 000 85 270 89 240 91 440 93 930 95 170 98 640 
Latvia 8 780 8 500 9 820 10 870 11 350 11 860 12 350 12 800 13 810 15 130 
Malta 14 880 15 920 16 420 17 060 17 950 19 570 21 690 22 750 24 190 25 510 
Netherlands 37 800 38 470 38 960 38 970 39 300 39 820 40 730 41 590 43 090 44 920 
Poland 8 240 9 390 9 870 10 100 10 250 10 680 11 190 11 100 12 160 12 920 
Portugal 16 600 16 990 16 680 16 010 16 300 16 640 17 350 18 060 19 020 19 830 
Romania 6 150 6 190 6 550 6 640 7 190 7 550 8 090 8 650 9 580 10 510 
Slovakia 11 830 12 540 13 190 13 590 13 740 14 070 14 710 14 920 15 540 16 470 
Slovenia 17 760 17 750 18 050 17 630 17 700 18 250 18 830 19 550 20 810 22 080 
Sweden 33 730 39 920 43 590 45 050 45 850 45 130 46 350 47 000 47 690 46 310 
Source: Eurostat: https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nama_10_pc&lang=en (16.01.2020) 
 
 
 
